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Ma Ying-jeou, the president of the Republic of 
China (ROC), was inaugurated on May 20, 2012, 
after winning his re-election bid on January 14 of that 
year. In a cabinet reshuffle in September 2012, several 
important members of his national security team were 
replaced by some new faces. These leadership changes 
suggest that President Ma will press ahead with more 
balanced Taiwan-U.S. and cross-strait policies.
Among other changes, Straits Exchange Foundation 
chairman Chiang Pin-kung has been replaced by 
Kuomintang (KMT) secretary-general Lin Join-sane; 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman Lai 
Shin-yuan has been appointed representative to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO); and National 
Security Council adviser Wang Yu-chi has taken over 
as MAC chairman. Former KMT secretary-general 
King Pu-tsung has taken over the position of chief 
representative to the United States from Jason Yuan, 
who assumes the post of secretary-general of the 
National Security Council, following the resignation 
of council head Hu Wei-chen. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Timothy C.T. Yang has been promoted to serve 
as secretary-general of the Presidential Office, while 
Taiwan’s representative to the European Union, David 
Lin, takes over the ministerial post. These leadership 
changes, as part of the Ma administration’s move 
to reshuffle its national security and foreign affairs 
portfolios, might significantly affect Taiwan-U.S. and 
cross-strait relations. 
For example, King Pu-tsung, the new representative 
to the United States, has been one of Ma’s closest 
aides since joining his campaign team, helping him 
win the Taipei mayoral elections in 1997 and 2001 
and presidential elections in 2008 and 2012. While 
King’s lack of experience in foreign affairs was heavily 
criticized following his appointment, he was a senior 
adviser to the KMT’s international affairs department 
and has actually taken part in many related programs 
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and activities. During Ma’s presidential campaign in 
2011, he conducted a thirteen-day trip to the United 
States in his role as top campaign adviser to boost Ma’s 
overseas support and facilitate communication with 
high-level U.S. officials, thereby winning the support 
of the Obama administration.1 
Wang Yu-chi, the new MAC chairman, was 
formerly another one of Ma’s top aides, having 
served as a spokesman for the Presidential Office 
and been involved in policymaking in the first Ma 
administration. Commenting on the appointment, 
Wang said that he would continue to promote cross-
strait relations and seek to convey the government’s 
cross-strait policies in a clear and accurate manner.2 
Additionally, newly appointed WTO representative 
Lai Shin-yuan said she would take advantage of her 
four years of experience at the MAC to promote the 
nation’s global participation at the WTO, based on the 
success of the Ma administration’s cross-strait policies.3
Following this introduction to the ROC’s leadership 
changes, this commentary will discuss leadership 
changes in the United States and China, as well as their 
impact on U.S.-Taiwan and cross-strait relations. The 
third part will explore why these leadership changes 
do not necessarily mean a shift in Ma’s cross-strait 
policies. The fourth part will focus on King Pu-tsung’s 
diplomatic mission in the United States. Then, the 
fifth part will demonstrate why Taiwan will not take 
joint military actions with China on the issue of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The sixth section discusses 
what Taiwan can expect from its economic and 
security partnership with the United States. Finally, the 
conclusion will argue that the Taiwan-U.S. relationship 
is the cornerstone of the ROC’s national security and 
is essential for the ongoing process of promoting the 
institutionalization of cross-strait relations.
 1 Mo Yan-chih, “King Pu-tsung Is New Envoy to the U.S.,” Taipei Times, 
September 20, 2012, 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/
archives/2012/09/20/2003543196.
 2 Mo Yan-chih, “Top China Affairs Officials Reshuffled,” Taipei Times, 
September 20, 2012, 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/
archives/2012/09/20/2003543195.
 3 Ibid.
Leadership Changes in the United States and 
China and Their Impact on U.S.-Taiwan and 
Cross-Strait Relations 
The implications of President Obama’s re-election 
and subsequent nomination of John Kerry as his 
new secretary of state are that the administration’s 
“rebalancing” strategy and cross-strait policy might not 
only remain intact but also become even stronger.4 One 
may wonder how the United States can support and 
sustain its rebalancing strategy while its economy is in 
relative decline and its defense budget is shrinking. In 
fact, unlike during the Vietnam War era, the United 
States plans to make good use of the resources of its 
allies and partners through military training and 
drills, forward deployment of U.S. forces on a rotation 
basis, its “air-sea battle” concept, forward-deployed 
diplomacy, value systems, and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).5 In other words, whether the U.S. 
rebalancing toward Asia succeeds depends not only on 
the United States’ own resources but on cooperation 
and coordination between the United States and its 
allies and partners. 
In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping’s 
simultaneous assumption of the three most important 
political positions—secretary-general of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), and president of the 
PRC (starting from March 2013)—might grant 
him sufficient authority and power to demonstrate 
his muscle at home and abroad. For example, Xi 
appointed a new commander of the air force one 
week after assuming chairmanship of CMC. He also 
fired a corrupt local official shortly after the scandal 
was exposed on the Internet. Similar corruption cases 
used to take several months or even years to close 
after lengthy investigations. In addition, Xi decided 
 4 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Nomination of Senator John 
Kerry as Secretary of State,” White House, December 21, 2012, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/21/remarks-president-nomination-
senator-john-kerry-secretary-state.
 5 Ann Capling and John Revenhill, “Multilateralising Regionalism: What 
Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?” Pacific Review 24, no. 5, 
December 2011, 553–75. 
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to implement a quarantine policy in the South China 
Sea. Moreover, he continues to implement a policy of 
dispatching vessels to the disputed waters near the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
While China’s new leadership might take a more 
assertive stance in the waters of the East and South 
China Seas than ever before, Xi also has to take the 
U.S. rebalancing strategy toward Asia into serious 
consideration following the re-election of President 
Obama. It seems unlikely that Xi will take provocative 
actions toward the United States. Beijing will choose a 
nonconfrontational approach when facing a formidable 
U.S. security presence in Asia. In the diplomatic, 
political, and economic dimensions, however, Xi will 
make good use of China’s diplomacy, soft power, and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) to compete with the United States.6 While 
accommodating U.S. rebalancing, Xi might still try to 
deal with the United States in his own way and attempt 
to make some political breakthroughs across the strait 
in the years ahead. In his policy toward Taiwan, Xi will 
increasingly exert pressure on the Ma administration to 
promote political dialogue across the strait, including 
on issues such as “two sides, one country,” mutual 
respect for the political status across the strait, building 
mutual trust in military and security affairs, and a 
peace agreement.
Leadership Changes and Cross-strait Policies
Since President Ma was re-elected in early 2012, 
China has intensified its promotion of political 
dialogue across the strait, believing that Ma would 
accommodate Beijing’s peaceful development 
strategy in his second term. For example, at the 
KMT-CCP Forum held in Harbin on July 28, 2012, 
Jia Qinlin, chairman of China’s Political Consultative 
Committee, suggested that “both sides of [the] 
Taiwan Strait belong to one China” or “two sides, 
one country.” However, this author argued that Taipei 
 6 Suthichai Yoon, “TPP vs. RCEP: A New Washington-Beijing Tug-of-War?” 
Nation, December 6, 2012, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/TPP-vs-
RCEP-A-new-Washington-Beijing-tug-of-war-30195647.html.
could not accept such a notion because the outside 
world, the United States and Japan in particular, 
would treat such a formulation as Taiwan and China 
combining to become a new country.7
Amid suspicions about Ma’s cross-strait policies, 
he explained his reasoning in an address to military 
personnel on December 27, 2012.8 First, the president 
pointed out that he defines Taiwan-China relations as a 
“special relationship,” stressing that the military must 
recognize the special status of cross-strait relations 
while prioritizing its duty to ensure national security. 
Second, he noted that the ROC government is a 
sovereign state in accordance with its constitution. 
According to this constitution, “mainland China” is 
part of the ROC’s territory. However, Taiwan cannot 
deny the existence of the PRC government being the 
de facto authority on the mainland. Consequently, 
the cross-strait relationship is not a state-to-state 
relationship but a special relationship between two 
sides who do not recognize each other’s sovereignty, 
but also do not deny each other’s existence.9
Third, Ma said the government would continue 
to promote peace across the Taiwan Strait under the 
basis of the “1992 consensus.”10 According to him, 
the cross-strait status is defined in accordance with 
the ROC constitution, and the two sides are able to 
put aside disputes and pursue a win-win situation by 
promoting peace across the Taiwan Strait. Fourth, the 
“three no’s” are a policy proposed by Ma in 2008: no 
pursuit of unification, no Taiwanese independence, and 
no use of force in handling cross-strait relations.11 Ma 
insisted that his administration would pursue cross-
strait peace while maintaining the status quo across 
the strait. He also said the military would maintain a 
small but strong force to ensure the nation’s security.
 7 This author clearly expressed his strong opposition to Jia Qinlin’s notion of “two 
sides, one country” in the afternoon session at the KMT-CCP Forum in Harbin 
on July 28, 2012.
 8 Mo Yan-chih, “Ma Pushes ‘Special’ Cross-Strait Relations,” Taipei Times, 
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Fifth, all politically sensitive issues will be 
controversial in Taiwan. For example, in 2011 the 
KMT proposed the issue of a cross-strait peace 
accord in response to increasingly vocal demands 
from the right wing of the party. The KMT raised the 
issue simply because it was a campaign issue during 
2007–8. As a result of insufficient support in Taiwan 
society, Ma placed three conditions on the issue of 
a peace accord, namely, popular support, legislative 
supervision, and national need. In order to put the 
public at ease, he even set a prerequisite for the peace 
accord, i.e., support by a national referendum. The 
same would be true for a cross-strait agreement on 
military trust and cooperation, since there has not 
been a sufficient social base in support of such an 
agreement. Given China’s deployment of missiles 
along its coastal provinces and its opposition to U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan, a cross-strait security agreement 
has never been a realistic idea in Taiwan, much less 
one powerful enough to overcome strong resistance 
from the ROC’s defense ministry. 
Last but not least, President Ma’s firm stance on 
his policies toward the United States and China is 
clearly evident from his two important speeches. 
In a video conference with the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) on May 12, 2011, 
he proposed three lines of defense: institutionalizing 
the cross-strait rapprochement, enhancing Taiwan’s 
contributions to international development, and 
aligning Taiwan’s defense with its diplomacy.12 In 
his inaugural address in 2012, Ma further proposed 
the “three legs of national security,” namely, 
cross-strait peace, viable diplomacy, and a strong 
defense.13 Having reaffirmed his long-standing 
position on cross-strait policies and Taipei’s policy 
toward Washington, he implied that only the U.S. 
 12 Ma Ying-jeou, “Building National Security for the Republic of China,” Office 
of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 12, 2011, http://english.
president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284.
 13 Ma Ying-jeou, “Upholding Ideals, Working Together for Reform and 
Creating Greater Well-being for Taiwan,” Office of the President, Republic 
of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2012, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.
aspx?tabid=491&itemid=27199.
security commitment can make the three legs walk 
firmly and healthily. 
Leadership Changes and U.S.-Taiwan Relations
At a press conference on December 27, 2012, 
Joseph Wu, executive director of the Policy Research 
Committee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
and Taipei’s former representative to Washington, said 
that the United States is concerned about the lack of 
transparency in cross-strait negotiations and the lack 
of communication between Taipei and Washington.14 
Wu also said that Washington has expressed concern 
through various channels about Taiwan’s position on 
the disputes in the East and South China Seas, saying 
that Taipei appears to “have chosen to cooperate 
with China in challenging Japan and the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance” and adding that Taiwan is standing 
on the opposite side of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific strategic landscape.15 However, it is unlikely 
that there will be major problems between Taipei 
and Washington. 
As Taiwan’s top representative to the United 
States, King Pu-tsung has pledged to convey Ma’s 
desire to enhance bilateral ties with the United 
States.16 Additionally, the appointment of Ma’s close 
aide as de facto ambassador to the United States 
indicates that Taipei places great importance on its 
relations with Washington. King said that during his 
first three weeks in office he visited more than 20 
senior U.S. government officials and 24 members of 
Congress.17 King also expressed confidence about his 
mission in Washington. He said that the long-stalled 
 14 Enru Lin, “Washington Envoy Has Listed No Goals: DPP’s U.S. Representative,” 
China Post, December 27, 2012, http://chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/
national-news/2012/12/27/365394/Washington-envoy.htm.
 15 Ibid.
 16 Joseph Yeh, “King Bombarded in First Legislative Session,” China Post, 
December 27, 2012, http://chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2012/12/27/365392/King-bombarded.htm; and Shih Hsiu-chuan 
and Chris Wang, “King Grilled on U.S., Sexual Orientation,” Taipei 
Times, December 27, 2012, 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/
archives/2012/12/27/2003551085.
 17 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “U.S. Welcomed Appointment of Ma’s ‘Confidant’: King,” 
Taipei Times, December 28, 2012, 3, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/
archives/2012/12/28/2003551182.
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talks about the Taiwan-U.S. Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) will restart soon.18 
The TIFA was signed in 1994 as a framework for 
Taiwan-U.S. trade dialogue in the absence of official 
diplomatic ties but has been suspended since 2007, 
mainly because of controversies over imports of U.S. 
beef. Taiwan’s passage of amendments to the food 
safety act in July 2012, which opened the market to 
U.S. beef, has paved the way for TIFA negotiations 
in the near future.
On the disputed Diaoyu Islands, which lie about 
120 nautical miles (220 kilometers) northeast of 
Taiwan, Ma’s position has been firm. Amid growing 
tensions over the disputed archipelago, he inspected 
military units on September 19, 2012, and was 
briefed on developments. “We have a full grasp of 
the situation,” he said, adding that the air force, navy, 
and coast guard are keeping a close eye on the waters 
around the Diaoyu Islands and other nearby islands in 
the region. Meanwhile, the defense ministry said in a 
statement that it beefed up air patrols over the Diaoyu 
Islands and waters surrounding the islands. Ma’s 
remarks came amid an escalation of the territorial 
dispute after the Japanese government, which already 
administers the islands, nationalized the issue by 
buying three of them from a private Japanese owner.19
In reaffirming Taiwan’s sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu Islands, Ma reiterated the government’s policy 
of resolving the dispute based on the principles of 
safeguarding sovereignty, shelving differences, 
pursuing peace and reciprocity, and jointly exploring 
resources. The president also repeated his call for all 
sides involved in the dispute—Taiwan, Japan, and 
China—to adopt the East China Sea Peace Initiative 
(ECSPI) he proposed on August 5, 2012, and to address 
the issue through peaceful means.20 In his ECSPI, 
 18 Yeh, “King Bombarded in First Legislative Session”; and Shih and Wang, “King 
Grilled on U.S.” 
 19 “Ma Inspects Arms Amid Sovereignty Row over Islands,” Taipei Times, 
September 20, 2012, 3, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/
archives/2012/09/20/2003543221.
 20 For more on Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative, see “President Ma Attends 
Activities Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace 
Treaty,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), August 5, 2012, 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=27898. 
Ma called on the parties concerned to adhere to the 
following principles: 
1. Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon 
dialogue
3. Observe international law and resolve 
disputes through peaceful means
4. Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the 
East China Sea
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on 
exploring and developing resources in the 
East China Sea21
In the wake of Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu 
Islands, the ROC’s stance on the disputed islands is 
firm: Taiwan will never give an inch on the issue 
of sovereignty. Since the sovereignty issue cannot 
be resolved in the short run, however, the disputes 
can be put aside for the time being. Because Taiwan 
claims sovereignty over the islands but Japan enjoys 
administrative powers over them, the ROC has to 
adopt a flexible approach. The sovereignty issue is 
very remote, but a fishing agreement between Tokyo 
and Taipei is reachable. The bottom line of the ROC’s 
stance on the Diaoyu Islands is that Taiwan will never 
take joint military actions against Japan, much less the 
United States. Nevertheless, whether Taiwan is entering 
into negotiations on a fishing agreement with Japan or 
enforcing national laws on its territorial sea baseline, 
the country needs military strength as a backup.
What Should Taiwan Expect from the United States?
When President Obama proposed his rebalancing 
strategy in 2010, his primary goal at that time was to 
double U.S. exports to Asia within five years, thereby 
rebalancing U.S. trade deficits.22 In order to realize 
 21 “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China 
(Taiwan), November 14, 2012, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/
TopicsIndex/?opno=cc7f748f-f55f-4eeb-91b4-cf4a28bbb86f.
 22 “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall,” Tokyo, Japan, The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 14, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall. 
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this goal, the Obama administration must bear the 
following suggestions in mind when negotiating with 
states in the Asia-Pacific region.
First, the international political economy is 
conducted on a quid pro quo basis. It is by no means 
a one-way transaction. While the United States is 
moving in the direction of doubling its exports 
to Asia, regional states also need to double their 
exports to the United States. Only in this way will 
international trade be sustained and endure for a 
long time.
Second, the TPP, as the most important instrument 
in the U.S. plan to double exports to Asia, should 
open its doors to welcome the most promising Asian 
economies, or at least U.S. allies and partners. This 
would allow the United States to create a win-win 
situation for Asia-Pacific countries and itself.23
Third, only after joining the TPP can these 
countries negotiate with the United States to further 
liberalize their economies over a certain period 
ranging from five to ten years, depending on their 
economic and trade status. Moreover, only after 
removing these tariff and non-tariff barriers can 
these countries truly help the United States double 
its exports to their respective markets.
Finally, during the negotiating process between 
Asia-Pacific countries and the United States, 
Washington should bear in mind that benefits 
must be considered on a reciprocal basis. If their 
economic and trading structure is hurt by U.S. 
demands, these countries can hardly help the 
Obama administration realize its goal by 2015. In 
the face of ASEAN’s emerging plans for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the 
Obama administration cannot simply afford to let 
down its allies and partners.24
Taiwan, in particular, needs to join the TPP 
negotiations for the following three reasons. First, 
if the ROC continues to negotiate with the United 
 23 Capling and Revenhill, “Multilateralising Regionalism.” 
 24 Yoon, “TPP vs. RCEP.”
States under TIFA, the United States might close 
the door of TIFA at any time, leaving Taiwan with 
only disappointment and dissatisfaction. Second, 
among the eighteen items in TIFA negotiations, only 
the U.S. beef issue was resolved, leaving seventeen 
items still to be dealt with. In particular, U.S. pork 
imports would be a disaster for Taiwan. In order for 
the recent food safety amendments to be approved by 
the Legislative Yuan, the Ma administration promised 
that the U.S. beef issue would be separated from 
the U.S. pork issue. Once the latter is again raised, 
however, the Ma administration will be embarrassed 
and attacked by the opposition. Third, only if the 
Obama administration grants Taiwan the insider 
status of joining the TPP will the ROC government 
have the bargaining chips necessary to convince 
the people of Taiwan to accept the conditions and 
requirements of further liberalization. 
Conclusion
The ROC cannot embrace China’s economy without 
also embracing the U.S. security commitment because 
doing so would be political suicide. However, the U.S. 
security commitment and strategic reassurance cannot 
help Taiwan stand up economically. In the absence of 
cross-strait economic cooperation, Taiwan might be 
marginalized in the ongoing process of East Asian 
economic integration. In order to prevent Taiwan from 
depending too heavily on China’s economy, the ROC 
hopes that the United States will extend assistance to 
Taipei by upgrading Taiwan to insider status in the 
TPP negotiations.
In the future, as long as the KMT is the ruling 
party, the ROC will continue to stick to its “three 
no’s” policy of no independence, no unification, and 
no use of force, as well as its strategic approach of 
“making peace with China, making friends with 
Japan, and taking a pro-U.S. policy.” The national 
security and cross-strait leadership changes of the 
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Ma administration indicate that Ma is implementing 
what he promised in his video conference with 
CSIS in May 2011 and his inauguration address on 
May 20, 2012. On both occasions, he pointed out 
that the Taiwan-U.S. relationship is the cornerstone 
of the ROC’s national security while promoting 
the institutionalization of cross-strait relations. 
The reason for Ma’s remarks is his awareness that 
only with the U.S. security commitment in hand 
can Taiwan have sufficient confidence in dealing 
with China to enjoy the economic benefits and 
greater peace of mind that come from an improved 
cross-strait relationship. •
